The U.S. regulatory system grew enormously in scale, scope and complexity in recent decades. U.S. economic policies also became less predictable. I present several pieces of evidence related to these developments and discuss some of their consequences. I then sketch a few ideas to arrest or reverse these developments. In this regard, I stress the importance of simplicity in regulatory design, the advantages of policy designs that foster predictable regulatory responses, and the need for institutions that restrain ineffective, excessively burdensome and capricious regulations.
I. Three Principles for a Vibrant Economy
In his essay on how the United States can "Return to a Vibrant Economy," George Shultz (2013) offers several worthy principles to guide policy makers. Here are three of them:
1. Keep the regulatory system clear, simple, and easy to administer, and then live with it.
2. Keep the tax system as simple as possible. Let's review the U.S. situation in relation to these principles, starting with the regulatory system.
II. Aspects of the U.S. Situation
A. An Expanding Regulatory State Figure 1 shows page counts for the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), which compiles all federal regulations in effect each year. 2 The CFR expanded eight-fold over the past 56 years, reflecting tremendous growth in the scale and complexity of federal regulations. At nearly 180,000 pages, the CFR contains as many words as 133 copies of the King James Bible! 3 While
Ten Commandments sufficed for the Hebrew God of the Old Testament, the CFR contains about one million commandments in the form of "shall," "must," "may not, " "prohibited," and "required." 4 Let me hasten to add that CFR page counts seriously understate the scale and growth of the regulatory state. Key pronouncements by regulatory authorities often involve various forms of Figure 1 strongly suggests that the regulatory leviathan is a bipartisan creation: The regulatory code consistently grew during both Democratic and Republican presidencies. There are exceptions -the first term of Ronald Reagan, and the first term of Bill Clinton, for examplebut they are few and short-lived. This observation carries an important corollary: Simply putting one political party or the other in charge of the federal government is unlikely, by itself, to reverse or permanently arrest the expansion of the regulatory state. That goal requires a more fundamental shift in our approach to regulation.
It's hard to summarize the scale of state and local government regulation, or its growth over time. Consider, instead, just one example: occupational licensing. The fraction of workers who must obtain a government-mandated license to lawfully perform their jobs rose from less than 5 percent in the 1950s to 29 percent in 2008. 7 About one-third of the growth in occupational licensing since the 1960s reflects changes in the mix of jobs. 8 The other two-thirds reflects a greater prevalence of licensing requirements within occupations.
Licensing requirements make sense in a few occupations, as a means to protect people from unscrupulous or incompetent providers. But do we really need onerous licensing requirements for barbers, manicurists, tree trimmers, funeral attendants, massage therapists, auctioneers, sign language interpreters, and hundreds of other jobs? 9 Worker certification, which preserves 7 See Kleiner and Krueger (2013) . Carpenter et al. (2012) provide an illuminating description of state licensure requirements in 102 low-and moderate-income occupations. Kleiner (2015) and U.S. Department of the Treasury Office of Economic Policy (2015) provide useful analyses of occupational licensing in the United States, discussions of costs and benefits, and recommendations for reforms. Davis and Haltiwanger (2014) discuss a broad range of factors, including occupational licensing, that contributed to declines in U.S. business dynamism and labor market fluidity in recent decades. They also provide evidence that these developments led to lower employment rates, especially for younger and less educated persons. 8 U.S. Department of the Treasury Office of Economic Policy (2015) , page 20. 9 These examples are drawn from Table 1 in Carpenter et al. (2012) . According to estimates from the Council of State Governments, "over 1,100 jobs were licensed, certified, or registered consumer choice and competition among suppliers, is usually a better response to concerns about supplier quality. All too often, licensing serves mainly to protect incumbent businesses and workers from competition -to the detriment of customers, young workers, and would-be entrepreneurs.
To be sure, some expansion of the regulatory state can be seen as an efficient, welfareenhancing response to rising populations and real incomes, and to the increasing complexity of our economy and society. 10 But I find it impossible to see the current U.S. system as an approximately efficient regulatory response to the complexities of modern life. If occupational licensing is really about consumer protection, why does the average cosmetologist spend 372 days in training to obtain a government-mandated license, while the average emergency medical technician spends 33 days? 11 To take another example, does anyone believe that regulatory resistance to Uber's ride-sharing service is truly motivated by a concern for consumer welfare?
International comparisons reinforce concerns about U.S. regulatory overreach. According to the World Bank's latest Doing Business report, the United States ranks 51st out of 190 countries in the ease of starting a new business.
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B. A Byzantine Tax Code
The size and complexity of the U.S. tax code also grew dramatically in recent decades. Mulligan and Shleifer (2005) and Shleifer (2010). In contrast, Tabarrok and Cowen (2015) argue that increasingly easy access to information about product quality, worker performance and business reputations undermines the traditional case for many forms of economic regulation. 11 Carpenter et al. (2012 The federal tax code is so large and complex partly because policy makers (and citizens) insist on using it to bestow financial favors on certain activities and groups. This fact is evident in the enormous volume of "tax expenditures" -tax revenues foregone because of rules that grant tax breaks under particular conditions and for certain taxpayers. The Taxpayer Advocate estimates that fiscal year 2015 tax expenditures amount to about $1.4 trillion. 17 By way of comparison, all direct federal spending was about $3.5 trillion in 2014.
Aside from the sheer complexity of its tax system, the United States fares poorly compared to other countries in terms of tax burdens on business activity -young businesses, in particular. Djankov et al. (2010) See Baker, Bloom and Davis (2016) . 20 In constructing our EPU index, we scale the frequency of articles about economic policy uncertainty by the number of all articles in the same newspaper and month. The EPU index in Figure 2 is from Baker et al. (2014) . The historical version in Baker, Bloom and Davis (2016) and available at www.PolicyUncertainty.com -adds "war" and "tariff" to the policy term set, a modification that matters little after World War II. 21 Baker et al. (2014) point to the expansion of government involvement in the economy and rising political polarization as potential drivers of the upward drift in U.S. policy uncertainty.
interviewees -business people, market experts, economists, and the like -also perceive higher levels of policy uncertainty in recent years. In sharp contrast to the U.S. experience, our newspaper-based EPU index for the United Kingdom shows no secular drift over the past 50
years. The U.K. evidence tells us there was no general tendency for English-language newspapers to devote increasing attention to policy-related uncertainty irrespective of actual developments. In Taylor Figure 6 is an improved version of the tax code expirations index in Baker, Bloom and Davis (2012) and early drafts of our 2016 paper. To construct the figure, we draw on Congressional Budget Office sources that list federal tax code provisions scheduled to expire over the next ten years and their projected revenue effects. Specifically, in any given year, we compute the absolute dollar value of expiring tax code provisions for the current and next ten years, discount future expirations at a 50 percent annual rate, and sum the discounted absolute revenue effects over the current and next ten years. We apply a high discount rate on the view that uncertainty about tax code provisions set to expire in the out years are unlikely to be a major source of current concern.
December 2010 -only two weeks before new tax rates were set to take effect -before passing the Tax Last-minute resolutions of political fights over the federal government's debt ceiling and threats to shut down large parts of the federal government have the same character. These practices undermine predictability in government policy, and they create a more challenging and uncertain economic environment for households and businesses.
E. Regulation and Policy as Sources of Business Risks
In 2005, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued a regulation that requires most publicly held firms to include a discussion of "Risk Factors" in Part 1A of their 26 Planned government spending cuts under the Budget Control Act of 2011 were also part of the Fiscal Cliff.
annual 10-K filings. 27 In "How to Read a 10-K" at www.sec.gov/answers/reada10k.htm, the SEC describes Part 1A as follows:
Item 1A -"Risk Factors" includes information about the most significant risks that apply to the company or to its securities. Companies generally list the risk factors in order of their importance. In practice, this section focuses on the risks themselves, not how the company addresses those risks. Some risks may be true for the entire economy, some may apply only to the company's industry sector or geographic region, and some may be unique to the company. 
III. Taking Stock
So how does the U.S. policy situation measure up to the three Shultz principles for a vibrant economy? Poorly -and that's a charitable assessment. The regulatory apparatus has become increasingly expansive and complex over time. The federal tax code has grown hugely complicated. Policy has become less predictable. 30 Rather than embrace the Shultz principles, we have been marching away from them in haste. I now consider some of the consequences. Epstein (2011a,b) , Crews (2016) , Cochrane (2015) and Murray (2015) , among many others. Proposals to address the complexity of the U.S. tax code go back decades; see, for example, Hall and Rabushka (2007) , first edition published in 1985. Concerns about rising policy uncertainty are prominent in my earlier work with Baker and Bloom and in Taylor (2012) , among others.
A. Breeding Complexity and Uncertainty
The good Catholic Sisters who saw to my moral instruction in primary school devoted many hours to the Ten Commandments. They wanted my classmates and me to avoid sins. Their success in that regard is in doubt. But at least the Sisters could be confident that we did not sin out of ignorance or uncertainty. How they would have instructed us on one million commandments, I do not know. The delinquents in my school found it hard to absorb a mere ten.
There is a serious point here: The sheer volume and complexity of statutes, regulations, regulatory guidance, and tax code provisions -and their instability over time -are barriers to knowledge and comprehension of the law, sound planning, and avoidance of legal jeopardy. Just staying on the right side of the law has become a much more challenging and burdensome undertaking, especially for businesses. Thus, the enormous expansion of the regulatory state breeds complexity and uncertainty in economic affairs.
Moreover, as the regulatory state expanded, regulators acquired great power to interpret statutes, transform broad and vague legislative mandates into specific regulations (i.e., laws), and exercise discretion in crafting and enforcing regulations. As the system grew more complex, interpretation and enforcement became more uncertain and the scope for capricious regulator conduct grew. In this vein, Epstein (2011a, page 150) argues that an expansive regulatory state undermines the rule of law:
This expansion of the government's purview undoes virtually all of the procedural and structural features of the classical system: unbiased decisionmaking, judicial review of administrative actions on matters of fact and law, and retroactivity….
[A]s the scope of government activities increases, the far-flung nature of these activities leads to a great desire to take shortcuts in regulation, such that the older protections are treated as obstructions against the march of progress, and not as protections of individual rights.
In a similar vein, Cochrane (2015) argues that dramatic expansion of the regulatory state poses a danger to our political freedoms. He sees an "emerging threat of large discretionary regulation, used as a tool of political control…. Just who gets that visit from the EPA can have a powerful silencing effect." In sum, a large and complex regulatory state also breeds uncertainty in economic affairs by raising risks that regulators will exercise their discretion in a capricious manner, or use it as a tool of political control.
B. Disproportionate Burdens on Younger and Smaller Businesses
The burdens of regulation and regulatory complexity tend to fall more heavily on younger and smaller businesses for three reasons. First, there are fixed costs of regulatory compliance.
Whether a firm has one employee or one thousand, for example, U.S. law requires regular states. 31 Although other factors are also in play, this evidence fits the view that the growing scale of the U.S. regulatory system has discouraged the development of new businesses.
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These arguments also imply that regulatory and tax complexity discourage existing firms, even large ones, from expanding into new markets and products. For this reason, greater tax and regulatory complexity tend to soften competitive pressures and repress creative destruction more broadly. Indeed, ownership has become more concentrated in most U.S. industry sectors since at least the late 1990s. 33 The scale and complexity of the regulatory system and the tax code are among the drivers of greater concentration and softer competition in product markets.
C. Negative Economic Effects of Policy Uncertainty
There are also sound reasons for concern about the harmful effects of policy-related uncertainty. Because it's typically costly to reverse an investment or hiring decision, greater uncertainty naturally prompts businesses to pull back from capital expenditures and job creation. 34 Uncertainty also raises financing costs, further discouraging investment and job creation. 35 Weak investments in new technologies, capital goods, product development, and worker training undermine longer-run growth.
Motivated by this reasoning, my work with Baker and Bloom investigates the effects of policy uncertainty. Using firm-level data, we find that policy uncertainty raises stock price volatility in policy-sensitive and regulation-intensive sectors like defense, healthcare, financial services and infrastructure construction. We also find that increases in policy uncertainty brings 31 See Davis et al. (2006) and Decker et al. (2014) . 32 See Davis and Haltiwanger (2014, 2015) , Liang et al. (2014) and Karahan et al. (2015) . 33 See, for example, "Too Much of a Good Thing," The Economist, 26 March 2016; and "Daily Chart: Corporate Concentration," The Economist, 24 March 2016. 34 See Bernanke (1983) . 35 See, for example, Pastor and Veronesi (2013) and Gilchrist et al. (2014) .
reduced investment and employment growth rates for firms in these sectors. At the macroeconomic level, we find that upward policy uncertainty shocks foreshadow declines in aggregate investment, output and employment in the United States and other large economies. In short, our results indicate that policy uncertainty hampers economic progress. As we discuss in our 2016 paper, many other studies also find negative economic effects of policy uncertainty.
D. Regulatory Uncertainty Also Undermines Regulatory Goals
Viscusi (1983) provides a useful theoretical framework for analyzing the effects of regulatory uncertainty on investments in production capacity and quality. Firms choose a unit output level and a quality level. For given quality, costs rise with unit output. For given output, costs rise with quality. Here, higher quality includes things like lower pollutants per unit of output and lower health risks per unit of output and consumption.
Let x denote the regulatory penalty per unit of pollutant, health risk or other negative byproduct of producing or consuming the good. When investments are fully reversible, the effects of regulation are straightforward: A greater regulatory penalty x causes the firm to choose lower output and higher quality. Regulatory uncertainty generates no anticipation and uncertainty effects in this special case. Instead, output and quality respond to the regulatory penalty in place at the time.
In the realistic case when investments are not freely reversible, uncertainty about future regulatory policy depresses the firm's investments in both production capacity and quality.
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Negative effects on capacity reflect the possibility of a high regulatory penalty x in the future.
36 See Blyth et al. (2007) for an application of these ideas to investments in power plants and carbon capture and storage technologies. Teisberg (1993) shows that regulatory uncertainty also distorts the character of investments and the choice of production technology. In particular, regulatory uncertainty leads firms to favor smaller-scale investments and technologies with shorter development lead times.
Negative effects on investments in quality reflect the possibility of a low regulatory penalty in the future. For example, uncertainty about the future regulatory penalty on power plant emissions discourages current investments that would reduce emissions. In this way, regulatory uncertainty undermines regulatory goals.
E. The Overall Costs of Regulation
Crews (2016) Tax code complexity is costly as well, most obviously in the form of compliance burdens.
Complexity also increases the distortionary effects of taxation on labor supply, consumption and investment decisions. A basic principle of least-harm taxation calls for a broad tax base with uniform tax rates. Tax expenditures do the opposite, shrinking the tax base and requiring higher, more distortionary tax rates for any given level of revenues. 37 Tax system complexity also encourages the diversion of time and effort to socially unproductive activities -gaming the tax system, lobbying for tax rules that advance special interests, and the like.
IV. What to Do?
So how might we advance the three principles for a vibrant economy that I borrowed from George Shultz? I now sketch a few ideas, again borrowing heavily from others.
Design for Simplicity: Policy design profoundly affects the complexity of the regulatory system, for good or ill. As an example, consider how the government might curtail carbon dioxide emissions. One approach is to issue pages upon pages of detailed regulations that specify how to design and operate power plants, corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) standards for automobiles, which fuel mix to burn in various types of vehicles, energy efficiency standards for
home appliances, what type of light bulbs to use, and so on. The logic of this approach requires a rash of intrusive command-and-control regulations.
Another approach is to tax carbon emissions or fossil fuel consumption, the main source of carbon emissions. This approach lets people choose how to conduct their activities, but imposes a price on activities that emit carbon. It yields a smaller, simpler regulatory apparatus (to establish a system for taxing carbon). By preserving free choice, it also improves the odds that some individual or business will develop new and better ways to economize on carbon emissions -ways not envisioned by the regulators. 38 When that happens, the carbon tax gives others an incentive to adopt the new means to lower carbon emissions. As an added benefit, the revenues produced by a carbon tax can be used to lower other taxes.
As another example, consider the regulation of commercial banks. A traditional approach combines low capital requirements with extensive, detailed regulation of banking activities and asset holdings to prevent banks from taking on excessive risk. Why might commercial banks take on too much risk? For one reason, most bank deposit liabilities are insured by the government. Because depositors trust the government insurance program, they have little or no incentive to monitor the quality and riskiness of a bank's assets and liabilities. As a result, a commercial bank can attract deposits, and fund its asset holdings, regardless of the bank's riskiness. A second reason involves the potential for a liquidity or solvency crisis at one bank to spill over in a negative manner onto other banks and the larger financial system. When weighing the private benefits and costs of taking on more risk, the owners of a given bank do not (fully)
consider the potential for negative effects on other banks and the larger financial system. In other words, the bank's private incentives to trade off risk and reward may be poorly aligned with the social tradeoffs. Both reasons provide motivation for regulations that aim to prevent banks from taking on too much risk.
An alternative approach combines high tangible capital requirements with otherwise light regulation. High capital ensures that bank shareholders bear more of the costs when downside risks materialize. In this way, high capital requirements reduce a bank's incentive to take on risks that might be reckless from a societal perspective. Moreover, when a bank has more tangible capital, it can absorb greater losses before reaching a point of insolvency. The bank's greater capacity to absorb losses, in turn, reduces the scope for negative spillover effects on other than command-and-control regulations. See Carbon Washington at http://carbonwa.org for an explicit proposal modeled after a successful carbon tax regime in British Columbia.
financial institutions. In short, high tangible capital requirements reduce the incentives for excessive risk taking, and they limit the damage to the rest of the financial system when downsides risks materialize. On both counts, there is less need for complex and detailed regulations in a regime with high capital requirements. Chapter 14 could be implemented over a weekend, and it would leave operating subsidiaries outside of bankruptcy entirely. It would do this by moving the original financial firm's operations to a new bridge company that is not in bankruptcy. This bridge company would be recapitalized by leaving behind long-term unsecured debt (capital structure debt).
Foster Predictable Regulatory
The aim is to let a failing financial firm go through bankruptcy in a predictable, rulesbased manner without spillovers while people continue to use its financial services, just as people flew on American Airlines planes, bought Kmart sundries and tried on Hartmax suits when those firms were in bankruptcy.
This proposal has teeth only to the extent that run-prone financial institutions hold a good deal of long-term debt. Thus, an effective version of this bankruptcy reform goes hand in hand with regulations that require certain financial institutions to hold sufficient long-term debt. If larger financial system and the broader economy. The job facing regulators will also become immensely easier, and their responses to negative shocks will become more predictable.
Reassert Congressional Oversight: Some recent reform proposals would require explicit
Congressional approval before a "significant" new regulation or regulatory interpretation takes effect. The goal is to reassert Congressional oversight of the regulatory agencies so as to guard against the imposition of large new regulatory burdens without the consent of elected legislators.
Key details of such proposals include how to define "significant," how to assess whether a given regulation or interpretation meets the significance standard, and how to structure the Congressional approval process.
Reasserting Congressional oversight has obvious appeal, and it surely has a useful place in a broader regulatory reform package. 42 But the idea also has important limitations, even if implemented in a sensible manner. First, this type of reform applies to new regulations and interpretations only; it does nothing to address the enormous stock of regulations accumulated over decades. Second, the scale, scope and complexity of the regulatory state has expanded to such an extent that I do not think re-invigorated Congressional oversight is an adequate response.
That brings me to the next idea.
Restrain the Regulators: Here's a common-sense recommendation -before introducing a new regulation (or when reviewing an existing one), a regulatory agency should clearly describe the problem it seeks to address, assess its significance, explain why regulation is a good response, provide a sound cost-benefit analysis for any proposed regulatory action, and explain why the proposed action is better than alternatives -including the alternative of no regulatory 42 For a discussion of existing Congressional options for asserting oversight of regulatory agencies, see "The Trump Administration's Regulatory Reform Options," by Griffin Davis RegBlog,20 January 2017 at http://www.regblog.org/2017/01/20/davis-trump-administrationregulatory-reform-options/.
action. As it turns out, every president since Jimmy Carter has issued or reaffirmed executive orders broadly in line with this recommendation (Ellig, 2015) . And government agencies often carry out regulatory impact analyses that purport to implement some or all elements of this recommendation.
Unfortunately, regulatory impact analyses often fail to deliver as promised. There are other worthy proposals to restrain the regulators. For example, Murray (2015) advocates an inspired combination of civil disobedience and cooperatively underwritten lawsuits to push back against pointless, stupid and tyrannical regulations.
End The economic benefits of these uncertainty injections are hard to discern. Don't shoot yourself in the foot is apt advice.
Recognize the Limits of Regulation: Finally, we (citizens and policymakers) must recognize limits: Government action is not the right solution to every societal problem. And action at the federal level is not the right place to address every societal problem that calls for a government response. A government that does too much will do nothing well.
IV. Concluding Remarks
In recent years, many of my fellow economists speak of headwinds that curtail the possibilities for growth. Yes, we face headwinds. But many of the headwinds are of our own making. We can unmake them, too. Or, better yet, turn them into tailwinds.
Some degree of regulatory complexity and policy uncertainty will be with us always. But their extent, and the weight of their burdens, depends greatly on policy design and our approach to regulation, taxation and policy making. There is no fundamental economic law that forces us to endure the growth-inhibiting effects of an overly complex, expansive and burdensome regulatory system. There is no fundamental economic law that compels us to live with a byzantine tax code. There is certainly no fundamental law that requires politically manufactured injections of uncertainty into the economic environment facing households and businesses. A course correction is overdue. Porter Stemmer to deal with plurals. For example, "tax" and "taxes" have the same stem "tax" and are both captured by "tax". I ignore the distinction between upper case and lower case letters, e.g., treating "FICA" and "fica" as equivalent.
After obtaining the fraction of sentences in Part 1A that contain one or more policy terms, I
average across firms by year to obtain the data plotted in Figure 7 .
I organize the policy terms into broad categories, designated below in bold font. For convenience, I collect related terms into "topics" denoted by {}. A strike-through identifies terms I considered, but which do not appear in any Part 1A filing in my data set. Although some terms appear in multiple topics -e.g., "tax" appears in several topics listed under Taxes 
Policy Categories, Topics and Terms
Taxes: {taxes, tax, taxation, taxed}, {income tax, tax on individuals, personal tax}, {capital gains tax}, {dividend tax}, {mortgage interest deduction, deduction for mortgage interest}, {IRA account, Roth IRA, traditional IRA, 401-k}, {state and local tax deduction, deductibility of state and local tax}, {payroll tax, social security tax, social security contributions, Medicare taxes, FICA, unemployment tax, FUTA}, {sales tax, excise tax, value added tax, vat, goods and services tax, gross receipts tax}, {carbon tax, energy tax, btu tax}, {corporate tax, corporate profit tax, tax on corporate profit, business tax, profit tax}, {investment tax credit, accelerated depreciation}, {R&D tax credit, research and development tax credit}, {tax credit for lowincome housing, low-income housing credit}, {black liquor tax credit, black liquor credit}, {ethanol tax credit, ethanol credit, ethanol tax rebate}, {biofuel tax credit, biofuel producer tax credit, fuel excise tax rebate, fuel tax credit, alcohol fuel credit}, {property tax}, {fiscal cliff}, {Internal Revenue Service} Government Spending, Deficits and Debt: {government spending, government outlays, government appropriations, government purchases}, {defense spending, military spending, defense purchases, military purchases, defense appropriations}, {entitlement spending}, {government subsidy}, {fiscal stimulus}, {government deficit}, {federal budget, government budget, fiscal footing}, {gramm-rudman, balanced budget, balance the budget, budget battle, debt ceiling}, {fiscal cliff, government sequester, budget sequestration, government shutdown}, {sovereign debt}, {entitlement program, entitlement spending, government entitlements}, {oasdi, social security, Supplemental Security Income, ssi, disability insurance}, {Medicaid}, {Medicare}, {supplemental nutrition assistance program, food stamps, wic program}, {unemployment insurance, unemployment benefits, TAA program}, {government welfare, welfare reform, aid to families with dependent children, afdc, temporary assistance for needy
